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GEOFFREY H. PALMER v. TRUCK INSURANCE
EXCHANGE: AN ANALYSIS OF INSURANCE
COVERAGE FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Michael Traynort and Alson Choppelas tt

I.

INTRODUCTION

This action for insurance coverage arose out of the settlement of
an underlying action for trademark infringement.' The California
Supreme Court considered whether certain insurance policy
provisions relating to advertising liability arising from "title" or
"slogan" infringement covered infringement of a trademarked name.
The court, interpreting the provisions narrowly, held that the policy
provisions at issue did not provide coverage for the infringement of a
trademark. As interpreted by the court, the coverage clause only
insured against infringement of names of literary or artistic works or
names that were slogans. The clause did not insure against
infringement of a trademarked word embodied in a slogan. Further,
the court found that an exclusion clause in the policy expressly
excluded coverage for infringement of a registered trade mark, service
mark or trade name unless that trade mark, service mark or trade
name was a title or slogan. The court analyzed the meaning of the
word "title" and found that "title" could not subsume the definitions
of "trademark," "service mark," or "trade name" as understood in the
policy. The only meaning of the word "title" that fit within the
interpretation of the policy was that embodied in the name of a
literary or artistic work. Having found that the policy did not cover
trademark infringement, the court did not reach the second issue of
whether Insurance Code section 533 would bar indemnity for willful
trademark infringement.

t Partner, Cooley Godward LLP, San Francisco, California. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1960.
tt Candidate for J.D., Santa Clara University School of Law, 2000. The authors would like to
thank the editors of the Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal for their
efforts.
1. See generally Palmer v. Track Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 4th 1109, 988 P.2d 568, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 647 (1999).
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arose from a dispute over trademark infringement of a
registered mark used to identify a real estate developer in Santa
Clarita Valley. Newhall Land and Farming Company ("Newhall")
sued Easton Investments II ("Easton") and Westcreek Properties, Ltd.
("Westcreek"), for infringement of the registered mark "Valencia"
("Newhall action"). 2 Geoffrey H. Palmer, appellee in this action, was
the general partner of both Easton and Westcreek. A jury found that
Easton and Westcreek had infringed Newhall's trademark, and
awarded Newhall damages of nearly $2.3 million. 3 The jury also
found that Newhall and Westcreek's conduct was "willful. ' 4 Easton
and Westcreek appealed from the trial court's judgment entered on
the jury's verdict.
Soon after the jury verdict, Palmer tendered the Newhall action
to various insurance carriers, including Truck Insurance Exchange
("Truck"), the defendant in this action. Truck agreed to pay a portion
of the fees and costs of the appeal but reserved the right to contest
coverage of any infringement found against Easton and Westcreek.
During the pendency of the appeal, the Palmer defendants settled the
case with Newhall for $1,590,000. 5 Truck denied coverage and
refused to contribute to the settlement.
The comprehensive umbrella liability policy ("Policy"), issued
by Truck to Palmer, is the policy at issue in this appeal.6 The Policy
provided coverage for "advertising liability," defined as: "(1) Libel,
slander or defamation; ...(2) Infringement of copyright or of title or
of slogan;... committed or alleged to have been committed in any
advertisement, publicity article, broadcast or telecast and arising out
of the named insured's advertising activities."'7 The Policy excluded
coverage for trademark infringement:
This insurance does not apply, ... with respect to advertising
activities, to claim[s] made against the insured for ...infringement
of registered trade mark, service mark or trade name by use thereof
2. See id. at 1112,988 P.2d at 571, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650.

3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 1113,988 P.2d at 571, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 651.
6. The preliminary policies issued by the various insurance carriers were not at issue
before the California Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Plaintiffs were
not named insureds on the preliminary policies. The parties did not contest this part of the Court
of Appeal's ruling.
7. See Palmer, 21 Cal. 4th at 1114, 988 P.2d at 571, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 651 (describing
the terms of the Policy in question).
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as the registered trade mark, service mark or trade name of goods
or services sold, offered for sale or advertised, but this shall not
relate to titles or slogans...8
Palmer, Easton, and Westcreek, among others, sued Truck, and
other insurers not party to this appeal, seeking declaratory relief and
alleging a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and a breach of the duty to defend.9 Truck demurred. With
respect to the complaint, Truck argued that the "no action" clauses in
each of its policies foreclosed the plaintiffs' lawsuit because plaintiffs
settled the Newhall action without Truck's authorization. Truck also
argued that the policies excluded coverage for trademark
infringement. It further asserted that there was no duty to defend or
indemnify plaintiffs because the Newhall jury found the plaintiffs'
conduct willful. Finally, Truck argued that plaintiffs were not insured
under the Truck policies because they were not named in the policies
and thus lacked standing to sue.'0 The trial court sustained Truck's
demurrer without leave to amend on grounds that the Palmer
defendants lacked standing to sue and breached the "no action"
clauses of their policies. Consequently, the court dismissed Truck
from the case." The plaintiffs appealed.
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, holding that the
plaintiffs did have standing and did not breach the "no action" clause
of the Policy. The court also held that the defendant's conduct was
not willful within the meaning of Insurance Code section 533 2 and
that the terms "title" or "slogan" were not limited to artistic or literary
3
works for the purposes of covering infringement.1
Truck sought review in the California Supreme Court, which
granted review to consider two questions: (1) whether policy
language providing coverage for advertising liability caused by
infringement of title or of slogan, but excluding coverage for
infringement of trade mark, service mark or trade name (except
relating to) titles or slogans, covers infringement of any name; and (2)
whether Insurance Code section 533 bars indemnity for willful

8. Id.
9. See id. at 1113,988 P.2d at571,90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 651.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12 Palmer v. Truck Ins. Exch., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389,402 (Ct. App. 1998) (previously
published at 66 Cal. App. 4th 916). This case has been ordered depublished pending review by
the California Supreme Court.
13. See id. at407.
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14
trademark infringement.

I. DISCUSSION
The parties agreed that Truck had no duty to reimburse the
plaintiffs for the settlement during the pendency of the Newhall
appeal if the California Supreme Court found that the Policy did not
cover the underlying district court judgment. 5 The dispositive issue,

therefore, was whether the policy language relating to advertising
liability actually covered a judgment based on infringement of a name
like "Valencia."' 6 The analysis centered on the interpretation of the
policy definition of "advertising liability," which included
"Infringement of copyright or of title or of slogan. ' 17 The Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court disagreed on the interpretation of the
words "title" and "slogan." The Supreme Court overruled the Court
of Appeal, concluding that the infringement of the trademark
8
"Valencia" was not covered by the terms "title" and "slogan.'
Both courts analyzed various meanings of the word "title" based
on many dictionary definitions of the word. While the Court of
Appeal relied on a broad definition incorporating the "ordinary and
popular sense" of the term "title,"' 19 the Supreme Court narrowed the
interpretation of "title" to the specific use of the term in the Policy. 20
The Supreme Court concluded that, in the context of the coverage
clause, "title" could only mean the name of a literary or artistic

14. See Palmer,21 Cal. 4th at 1114,988 P.2d at 572, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652. California
Insurance Code section 533 provides: "An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act
of the insured; but he is not exonerated by the negligence of the insured, or of the insured's
agents or others." CAL INS. CODE ANN. § 533 (WEST 1999).
15. See Palmer,21 Cal. 4th at 1114, 988 P.2d at 572, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 1114, 988 P.2d at 571, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 651.
18. See id. at 1119,988 P.2d at 575,90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 655.
19. See Palmer,78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 405. The Court of Appeal relied on the following
definitions of the word "title:" "A mark, style, or designation; a distinctive appellation; the name
by which anything is known." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1331 (5th ed. 1979); and "1. the
name of a book, chapter, poem, essay, picture, statue, piece of music, play, movie, etc.... 3. a
descriptive name or appellation; epithet." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1492 (2d
college ed. 1980). "Epithet" in turn, is defined as "1. an adjective, noun, or phrase used to
characterize some person or thing.... 2. a descriptive name or title." Id. at 472. "Appellation"
is defined as "1. the act of calling by a name, 2. A name or title that describes or identifies a
person or thing; designation." Id. at 66. Similarly, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2400 (Ed. 1993) gives fourteen definitions for "title," including: "7. a descriptive
name, a distinctive appellation or designation ...
20. Palmer,78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 405.
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work. 1
The Court of Appeal interpreted the phrase "Infringement of
copyright or of title or of slogan," (emphasis added) as used in the
policy's definition of "advertising liability" to separate the concepts
of "copyright" from "title" or "slogan." It reasoned that the express
exclusion for trademark infringement in the exclusion clause
contemplates that there may be an infringement of title or slogan
without reference to copyright.22 The Court of Appeal analogized the
case to A Touch of Class Imports, Ltd. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co. 23 In A Touch of Class, the court concluded that a trademarked
phrase used within a title or slogan was covered by the definition of
advertising liability.24 In the Newhall action, the appellees were
charged with using the mark "Valencia" in conjunction with the name
of various building developments. 25 Without elaboration, the Court of
Appeal concluded that using the mark in the development titles fell
within the terms of the Policy and the Policy did not limit coverage to
copyrightable artistic or literary work.26 The Court of Appeal decided
that the Policy's use of the terms "title" and "slogan" was broad
enough to encompass use of the "Valencia ' '27 mark. The use of
"Valencia" therefore constituted an infringement.
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Court of
Appeal's findings. The court noted that "title" appears in both the
coverage clause defining advertising liability and the trademark
exclusion clause. There was no evidence within the Policy suggesting
that the use of "title" changed from clause to clause. 2 Thus, the court
assumed that "title" had the same meaning in each clause of the
Policy. The exclusion clause stated that
[t]his insurance does not apply... with respect to advertising
activities, to claim[s] made against the insured for... infringement
of registered trade mark, service mark, or trade name by use
thereof as the registered trade mark, service mark or trade name of
goods or services sold, offered for sale or advertised, but this shall
not relate to titles or slogans... 29
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id.
See id.
901 F. Supp. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
See id. at 176.
See Palmer,21 Cal. 4th at 1112,988 P.2d at 571, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650.
See Palmer,78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 407.
See id.
See Palmer,21 Cal. 4th at 1116,988 P.2d at 573,90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653.
Id. at 1117, 988 P.2d at 573-74, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653.
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The court interpreted this clause to exclude coverage for
infringement of a "registered trade mark, service mark or trade name"
unless that "trade mark, service mark or trade name" was a title or
slogan. Thus, if the definition of "title" subsumed the definitions of
"trade mark," "service mark," or "trade name" as understood in the
Policy, the rest of the exclusion clause would be rendered
meaningless. 30 The court concluded that the word "title" in the Policy
referred only to the name of a literary or artistic work. 31 Because the
infringed mark "Valencia" was not the name of a literary or artistic
work, the Policy provision providing coverage for infringement of
titles did not apply and Truck was not required to reimburse the
32
plaintiffs' settlement.
The Supreme Court also found that the word "slogan" did not
apply to the present action.33 The court relied on the Court of
Appeal's holding in another case, which stated: "While an insurer has
a duty to defend suits which potentially seek covered damages, it has
a duty to indemnify only where a judgment has been entered on a
theory which is actually (not potentially) covered by the policy. 3 4 In
the Newhall action, the jury found that the plaintiffs infringed
Newhall's trademark, not its slogans. The jury awarded damages on
profits realized from the infringing use of Newhall's mark, not from
the use of its slogans. Thus, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
Newhall judgment was entered on the theory of the plaintiffs'
infringement of mark, not the infringement of any slogans. 35 The
Court stated that although Newhall may have used the mark in a
slogan, this did not bring the judgment within the scope of coverage
for infringement of that slogan. Relying on the definition of a slogan
as "a brief attention-getting phrase used in advertising or promotion"
or a "phrase used repeatedly, as in promotion, '36 the court concluded
that "infringing use of a trademark that is merely a word in a phrase
used as a slogan is not the same as the infringing use of a slogan." 37

30. See id. at 1117,988 P.2d at 574,90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653-54.
31. See id. at 1119,988 P.2d at 575,90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 655.
32. See id. at 1119,988 P.2d at 575,90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 655-66.
33. See id. at 1120,988 P.2d at 576,90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 656.
34. Pahner,21 Cal. 4th at 1120, 988 P.2d at 576, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 656 (quoting Collin
v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 21 Cal. App. 4th 787, 802, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391, 398 (Ca. Ct. App.
1994)).
35. See id.
36. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1993) and AM.
HERITAGE COLLEGE DICT. (3d ed. 1993), respectively).
37. Id.
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Therefore the plaintiffs' infringement of the "Valencia" mark was not
covered by the word "slogan" as defined in the Policy.
IV. INSURANCE CODE SECTION

533

Having held that the Policy did not insure against the plaintiffs'
infringement, the California Supreme Court did not reach the question
of whether Insurance Code section 533 bars indemnity for willful
trademark infringement. Since the question was resolved by the
Court of Appeal, however, it warrants a brief discussion here.
In its argument to the Court of Appeal, Truck relied on Insurance
Code section 533, contending that public policy precluded insurance
coverage for willful acts of infringement. The lower court disagreed,
citing J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M.K 8 and Clemmer v.
Hartford Insurance Co. 3 9 These cases limited the meaning of
"willful" in section 533 to circumstances in which an act is inherently
harmful or committed with a "preconceived design to inflict harm."
An analogous Ninth Circuit case, Zurich Ins. Co. v. Killer Music,
4
Inc., 0 cited these same cases. In Zurich, the Ninth Circuit reversed a
summary judgment order in favor of an insurer on the ground that the
actions of the insured were not proven willful in the underlying
copyright suit within the meaning of section 533. The Zurich Court
reasoned:
A "clear line of authority" in California directs that "even an act
which is 'intentional' or 'willful' within the meaning of traditional
tort principles will not exonerate the insurer from liability under
[§] 533 unless it is done with a 'preconceived design to inflict
injury"' (citations omitted). The term "willful" is used to describe
"an act done with malevolence," (citation omitted), or with "malice
in fact" (citation omitted). A "'willful act' within the meaning of
section 533 means 'something more than the mere intentional
doing of an act constituting [ordinary] negligence,' and appears to
be something more than the intentional violation of a statute"
(citation omitted) (brackets in original).41

Although subjective harm need not be proven and can be
assumed from the facts, copyright infringement is not an act that is
willful per se.42 In Palmer, the Court of Appeal held that trademark
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

52 Cal. 3d 1009,804 P.2d 689, 151 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1991).
22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285 (Ca. Sup. Ct. 1978).
998 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 678.
See id. at 674.
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infringement is also an act that is not willful per se, and that the
plaintiffs' infringement did not satisfy either of the definitions of
willfulness discussed above.43 The court pointed out that wrongful
intent is not an element of trademark infringement; it is merely a
factor the court may consider in deciding whether to award enhanced
damages and attorney's fees.44 Since the court in the Newhall action
decided against awarding enhanced damages and attorney's fees, even
though the jury found Easton and Westcreek's infringement to be
willful, the Appellate Court in the Truck dispute refused to find that
the conduct was willful as a matter of law.
V. OTHER RELATED CASES

In Gulf Ins. Co v. Contreras,4 the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of
Appeals appeared to have reached a different result than the Palmer
court on res judicata grounds. Affirming the District Court, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. had a duty to defend
its insureds in a trademark dispute.46 Aetna had litigated its duty to
defend in the state court and lost. The District Court, affirming that
decision, gave full faith and credit to the state court's decision. 47 The
Ninth Circuit stated that the District Court properly invoked the
doctrine of res judicata and collateral estoppel to preclude Aetna from
raising the issue of whether it owed a duty to defend the insureds in
48
the state court litigation.
In Mez Industries,Inc. v. PacificNational Insurance Company,49
a case seeking insurance coverage against a patent infringement
claim, the Court of Appeal reached a different result from the Palmer
court on the Insurance Code section 533 issue. In Mez Industries, a
liability insurer providing coverage for an advertising injury refused
to defend its insured against an action charging the insured with
inducement of patent infringement. ° The plaintiff alleged that the
insured, a component manufacturer, used its advertising to encourage
its customers to put the components together in a way that infringed
43.

See Palmer,78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402.

44. See id. at 401.
45.

No. cv-95-2260, 1999 WL 1040120 (9th Cir., Nov. 16, 1999).

46. Seeid. at*l.
47. See id.
48, See id. In reaching that conclusion, the Ninth Circuit declined to decide whether a
state court's judgment on an insurer's duty to defend constitutes a final judgment or an
interlocutory order under California law.
49. 76 Cal. App. 4th 856,90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721 (Ct. App. 1999).
50. See id. at 861-62,90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724.
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the plaintiff's patents.51 The insurance policy provided for indemnity
and defense for injury caused by misappropriation of advertising
ideas or style of doing business and for infringement of copyright,
title, or slogan in the course of advertising. In the insured's ensuing
action for declaratory relief and breach of contract against the insurer,
the trial court sustained the insurer's demurrer without leave to amend
and entered a judgment of dismissal. 52 The Court of Appeal affirmed,
holding that no duty to defend ever arose, since the advertising injury
provisions of the policy did not provide coverage to the insured for
inducement of patent infringement.5 3 The court applied common
sense to the context of this case, stating that the policy terms could
not reasonably be read to include either patent infringement or the
inducement thereof.54 Moreover, even if the policy language was not
totally free from ambiguity, the insured could not have had an
objectively reasonable expectation of coverage for a claim of
inducing willful patent infringement. 55 The court also held that
coverage would have been precluded by Insurance Code section 533,
since an inducement to patent infringement cannot be committed
except as a knowing, intentional, and purposeful act that is clearly
wrongful and necessarily harmful.56
Appellate review to the
California Supreme Court was denied March 22, 2000.
VI. CONCLUSION

After analyzing the policy provisions, the California Supreme
Court in Palmer concluded that appellee's trademark infringement of
"Valencia" was not covered within the meaning of "title" or "slogan,"
and therefore appellant was exonerated from having to pay appellee's
settlement in the Newhall action. However, had the court concluded
in favor of appellee, it is unclear how the court would have resolved
the Insurance Code section 533 issue. Reconciling Mez Industries
with J.C. Penney, Clemmer, and Zurich, it appears that the Court of
Appeal's resolution of the issue turns on whether one of the elements
of infringement of the intellectual property at issue includes willful
intent. Since a finding of trademark infringement does not require a
finding of willfulness and infringement of a patent does, the Court of

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See id. at 863, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725.
See id. at 864, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726-27.
See id. at 875, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 734.
See id.
Mez, 76 Cal. App. 4th at 875, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 734.
See id. at 877-78, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 736.
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Appeal was able to distinguish Mez Industries from Palmer.
However, the California Supreme Court has not yet addressed this
issue, and may or may not agree with the Court of Appeal's ruling.

